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Abstract
The concept of environmental space (ES) has been put forward as a means of operationalising
sustainability. Based on three tenets, the recognition of environmental limits, a strong equity principle,
and a focus on resource consumption, the ES approach offers a cognitive framework for a
comprehensive and integrated approach to environmental/resource policy and management. With
growing concerns about mounting environmental pressures and looming ecological and resource
scarcity, it offers also a more appealing normative basis for dealing with these issues than the
‘environmental security’ discourse increasingly appropriated by governments.
In the 1990s, adoption of the environmental space approach was promoted foremost at the national
level by a non-governmental organization and a handful of academics. Although some governments
showed interest in the idea, it failed to make much headway. Reasons for that can be found in
methodological issues, a weak political support basis, and the collective action trap. No governments
adopted and implemented the ES approach as an overall framework for their sustainable development
efforts, in part because accepting limits on resource consumption on a national level seems to make
little sense as long as other countries are not willing to do the same (the collective action trap).
A preliminary assessment brings up the existence of many significant obstacles to the adoption of the
ES approach at the global level, whilst the agency basis is relatively weak and fragmented.
Consequently, the chances of significantly changing the global political-institutional architecture to
support an ES approach also seem dim. This leads to the conclusion that ‘What must be done, cannot
be done’, at least at this stage. The best prospects for advancing the approach lie in the adoption of a
global climate change regime based on the recognition of environmental limits and the acceptance of a
strong equity principle, in line with the ES approach. This could set a precedent for the development of
similar global regimes to address other areas of growing ecological and resource scarcity. In the mean
time, a focus on limiting resource consumption associated with specific environmental issues offers the
best basis for mobilising support for the adoption of ES principles.
Key words: environmental space; global environmental governance; ecological scarcity; resource
consumption; resource scarcity; sustainability; political-economy of the environment.
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3Introduction
The aim of this paper is to discuss, in a political-economic context, the prospects for
the adoption of the notion of ‘environmental space’ at the global level. The rationale
for doing so lies, on the one hand, in the intensification of environmental pressures
arising from the continuously growing global demand for resources and, on the other,
in the normative appeal of the ideas associated with the environmental space
concept.
Continued economic growth, in high income countries as well as countries
inappropriately referred to as ‘developing’, notably China and India, is responsible for
a continuously growing demand for resources. At the same time, world population
also continues to grow and may reach 9 or 10 billion people by the middle of the
century, many of whom will be aspiring to the standard of living achieved by the most
privileged on earth. In recent years, this has revived the debate about a looming
scarcity of resources, such as oil and other minerals, water, and fertile land (Brown,
2006; Cohen, 2007; Conca, 2005; Kerr, 2007). Moreover, there is a growing concern
that humans are transforming the earth’s ecosystems to the extent that this erodes
and undermines its capacity to deliver the many ‘services’ on which human well-
being depends, including liveable climatic conditions, creating a ‘new’ scarcity
(Pirages and Cousins, 2005; Simpson, et al., 2005). These developments, all the
more so when combined, are often regarded as sources of increased environmental
insecurity and conflict (Conley and Phillips, 2005; Kaplan, 1994; O'Reilly, 2005;
Renner, 2005). Governments, especially in the west, are studying and preparing
themselves for perceived threats to their national security arising from these
developments (Adam, 2007; Schwartz and Randall, 2003). However, their responses
may turn concerns about security into self-fulfilling prophecies, as efforts to protect
(environmental) security on a national basis are likely to result in increased inequality
and conflict. Almost inevitably, the adoption of the growing environmental national
insecurity scenario by governments will produce a bleak world indeed.
The notion of environmental space offers a more attractive perspective on the
challenge to come to terms with the global environmental challenge depicted above.
Potentially, the concept of environmental space provides a cognitive framework that
helps legitimate global environmental (including resource) governance without
detracting from the right of peoples to make their own decisions regarding the use of
resources and the kind of societies they want to live in (Bührs, 2007). However, the
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adoption of the concept as a basis for global governance faces formidable
obstacles. This paper focuses on, in particular, political-economic obstacles and
explores whether and how these may be overcome.
First, I will explain the notion of environmental space and elaborate a bit further on
the main tenets and principles. This is followed by a discussion of some of the
limitations of analyses and applications based on the concept, which may explain
why it has failed to gain much traction at the political level. Then, I present a
framework for analysing the political-economic aspects with the concept and present
some tentative propositions regarding the issues and obstacles to the adoption of the
environmental space approach. Finally, conclusions are drawn about whether and
how these obstacles might be overcome.
Environmental space: the concept, principles and rationales
The notion of environmental utilisation space was first introduced in the 1980s by
Horst Siebert, but was elaborated by Opschoor and others as a means of
operationalising the notion of sustainability (Buitenkamp, et al., 1993; Carley and
Spapens, 1998; De Jonge, et al., 2001; Hille, 1997; Opschoor and Weterings, 1994:
17-18). It has been defined by Carley & Spapens as “the total amount of energy, non-
renewable resources, land, water, wood and other resources which can be used
globally or regionally:
• without environmental damage
• without impinging on the rights of future generations; and
• within the context of equal rights to resource consumption and concern for the
quality of life all peoples (sic) in the world.” (Carley and Spapens,
1998: 9).
This definition draws attention to three main tenets that lie at the core of the
environmental space approach: a focus on resource consumption, a recognition of
environmental limits, and a concern with equity.
The focus on resources and resource consumption arguably is the most
characteristic feature of the environmental approach. Resource consumption is taken
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by environmental space analysts as the principal measure and basis for the
development of environmental policy. The underlying rationale for doing so is that
this provides for a more practical and meaningful way of addressing the proximate
causes of environmental problems than formulating policies (and solutions) for each
environmental problem separately. As the use of resources (which implies their
exploitation, transport, and consumption) brings about multiple environmental effects
(including energy use, emissions, the generation of waste and pollution), collectively
referred to as the ‘ecological rucksack’, reducing resource use provides a more
integrated approach to addressing numerous environmental problems. It is based on
the assumption that the links between environmental problems (effects) and their
resource use can be identified and adequately quantified to be able to specify by how
much a reduction of resource consumption (for the various categories of resources)
is required to bring about a decline in environmental pressures to the extent that the
capacity of ecosystems to provide environmental services, on which also human
well-being and survival relies, is safeguarded.
This last point implies the second main tenet of the environmental space approach,
namely the recognition of the existence of environmental limits and the possibility of
identifying and quantifying those limits. Although environmental space analysts
recognise that it is not possible to determine these limits with absolute precision, they
argue that enough is known about them to be able to set indicative (and adaptable)
targets. Environmental space advocates also concur with the precautionary principle:
uncertainty is no excuse for not accepting and setting limits. It should be noted that
this argument about limits does not so much refer to the idea that the world is running
out of resources, which Carley and Spapens characterise as a ‘red herring’ (Carley
and Spapens, 1998: 85). In most cases, limits are imposed by the ‘new scarcity’
(ecological limits), not by available reserves, although Hille and others note that, for a
range of non-renewable materials, depletion may indeed pose a problem, providing a
case for restrictions on consumption on the basis of absolute scarcity (Cohen, 2007;
Hille, 1997: 15).
The third main tenet of the environmental space approach is the adoption of a strong
equity principle. In principle, all people (those living now and future generations)
have equal rights to resource consumption. Proponents of the concept commonly
take the view that the amount of environmental space available should be distributed
on an equal per capita basis (Buitenkamp, et al., 1993: 18; Carley and Spapens,
1998: 66-74; Sachs, et al., 1998: 14-16). Equity is considered “both a moral and a
political necessity” (Carley and Spapens, 1998: 69). If there are limits to resource
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consumption, they should apply equally to all people. Gross inequalities in resource
consumption are likely to provoke or contribute to political conflict, and should
therefore be reduced and ultimately eliminated. As resources are exploited primarily
for the benefit of consumption, end-users (collectively, on a national basis) carry
foremost responsibility for the “full damaging effect of the ecological backpack” (and
thus for reductions if required), not the residents of the exporting countries (Carley
and Spapens, 1998: 61, 75-76).1
Based on these tenets (the focus on resource consumption, the existence of
ecological limits, and the strong equity principle), the amount of available
environmental space can be calculated for any group or geographical unit (region,
country or group of countries).
This amount is then divided by the number of people living in the relevant
geographical unit to determine a per capita entitlement to the resource. As, in most
cases, nation-states are seen as the most relevant unit to take political responsibility
for the level of resource consumption, the total allowable level of resource
consumption for nations (based on population size) is calculated. These national
entitlements can then be compared to existing levels of consumption. The difference
between these figures indicates the amount of over- or under-consumption or use. In
the case of over-use/consumption, this can be labelled the ‘sustainability gap’ (the
gap between what a country presently uses/consumes and what it should use to
remain within the assigned quota). For resources which are considered to be too
environmentally damaging or risky (such as chlorine and nuclear power),
environmental space is set at zero, implying a phase-out.
Environmental space analyses, covering about 90 per cent of all material flows, have
been undertaken and applied to a range of countries, notably in Europe. According to
these calculations, most high income countries use and consume resources way
above the environmental space that they are entitled to (Carley and Spapens, 1998:
30-47, 75-106). In many cases, the reductions required amount to more than 80 per
cent. For instance, for the EU it has been calculated that it would need to reduce its
consumption of aluminium by some 90%, of pig iron by 87%, and of cement by 85%,
1 It should be noted that environmental space analysts do use CO2 emissions as a basis for
determining the amount of environmental space associated with energy resources (rather than
the resources themselves), because of the “critical nature” of global warming, and because it
is “currently the best environmental indicator for fossil-fuel consumption” (Carley and
Spapens, 1998: 61)
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to bring EU consumption of these resources within sustainable levels.2 By contrast,
many poor countries still have considerable space to expand their consumption of
resources. Therefore, the adoption of the environmental space approach poses, in
first instance, a most formidable challenge to the high income countries. However, to
the extent that the economies of China, India and other countries are rapidly growing,
these countries, too, will need to accept limits if the world as a whole is to bring to
resource consumption to sustainable levels.3
The notion of environmental space is similar to and overlaps in some respects with
other concepts that aim to operationalise limits within which human impact should
stay to maintain ecological sustainability, notably carrying capacity and ecological
footprint. Traditionally, carrying capacity was defined in terms of the size of a
population that could be sustained within a particular ecosystem or region. Thus,
applied to humans, the concept implies that people should live mostly or even
exclusively from the resources available in the region in which they live. This raises
some tricky questions (regarding trade, differences in resource endowment between
regions, movements of people between regions or even within a country, and other),
and can give rise to quite unpalatable arguments, for instance, against providing food
aid to starving people in a region (Aitken, 1980). Also, in an increasingly
interdependent world, a totally ‘bio-regionalist’ position seems increasingly unrealistic
and untenable, as few people or societies would still aspire, or even be able, to live
solely from a regional resource base. More recently, proponents of the concept use
it in a global context, applying it to humanity as a whole, which is more realistic
(Arrow, et al., 1996) and provides a better link with the environmental space
approach. Assessing the ecological limits to resource use is, in large part, a local or
regional task that feeds into a global assessment of resource capacity, but does and
should not necessarily determine how many people live in a particular place (such as
a city).
The notion of ‘ecological footprint’ has enjoyed growing popularity ever since it was
put forward by Wackernagel and Rees (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). In some
2 (Wuppertal Institute for Climate Environment and Energy. and Friends of the Earth Europe.,
1995: 42)
3 As Brown notes, assuming that China’s economy continues to expand at 8 percent per year,
that its population increases to 1.45 billion by 2031, and that it will copy consumption levels
in the US, this country alone would demand two thirds of the current world grain harvest,
consume double the amount of current world paper production, and use more oil than current
world production (Brown, 2006: x).
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ways, the notions of environmental space and ecological footprint are very similar.
Both take a global perspective to sustainability and aim to quantify it. Both provide a
means for calculating the environmental impact of any particular group (including
countries), and the significant differences in that respect. Users of both concepts
raise questions regarding (in-) equity and (re-) distribution. In other respects,
however, the concepts are significantly different. First, they rely on different
methodologies. The concept of ecological footprint, by aggregating resource use
with the help of a single denominator (productive land) is particularly helpful for
educational purposes directed at calculating and comparing a population’s overall
environmental demands. To determine whether a country meets the sustainability
criterion (or is ‘in deficit’ or runs a ‘surplus’ with regard to its claims on the
environment), its total ecological footprint is compared with the total amount of
(productive) land within its borders. By contrast, the notion of environmental space
uses a range of indicators for different resources, and is not normally expressed in a
single or composite indicator (with some exceptions) because doing so is considered
methodologically problematic and inappropriate (Hille, 1997).
The methodological differences between the two concepts are important in several
respects. First, the different assessments of performance on the sustainability
criterion (may) have implications for views on whether existing levels of consumption
of a country are justified and remedial and/or compensatory measures are required.
Second, the concepts vary in terms of the nature and usefulness with regard to
providing policy guidance aimed at advancing sustainability (or reducing
unsustainability). Inasmuch as ecological footprint analyses are accompanied by
policy recommendations, they tend towards a national (‘bio-regionalist’) bias: the
general aim is to bring a country’s resource use in line with its natural capacity and
the size of its population. Obviously, this favours large countries with a relatively low
population density over small countries with a high population density (even if the
ecological footprint per capita in the former may be higher than in the latter), and has
implications for arguments about distributional justice. Moreover, general ecological
footprint analyses appear less fruitful in terms of providing specific policy guidance:
whereas environmental space indicators can be used as a basis for formulating
specific objectives and targets (which are commonly seen as the very rationale for
such analyses), ecological footprint indicators do not and cannot provide specific
clues about what can or should be done to advance sustainability (as footprints are a
composite measure of a range of different forms of resource use and environmental
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impacts, each of which is likely to differ with regard to environmental capacity and to
require different policies to advance sustainability).4
Given these considerations, from a policy perspective, the notion of environmental
space offers a more suitable and appropriate basis for ‘making sustainability
concrete’ than the other two concepts referred to above. However, that does not
mean that the operationalisation, adoption and implementation of the concept are
unproblematic (Bührs, 2004). Arguably, the adoption of an environmental space
approach at all levels of governance is imperative if humanity is to maintain its life
support system at an adequate level. However, as I will explain in the following
section, thus far the approach has failed to gain much political traction, in part
because of the limitations associated with the existing analyses and applications.
The environmental space approach: limitations of analyses and applications
Although considerable efforts have been put into the development of the
environmental space approach, its practical application has been very limited. In this
section, I will discuss some of the reasons for this, associated mostly with the
limitations of these efforts themselves. These limitations are related to:
methodological issues, the weak political support and agency basis for adoption of
the approach, and the existence of a collective action trap. These limitations have
received some, but insufficient, recognition from environmental space advocates.
Linking environmental problems with resource consumption is a plausible proposition
but fraught with considerable methodological difficulties. It assumes not only that
there is sufficient knowledge and information about the connections between
resource consumption (from exploitation, transport, their use in a wide range of
production processes, ultimate consumption and residuals management) and
environmental effects, but also that these connections can be quantified. Given the
interconnections between resources and the effects of their exploitation, use and
consumption, analysis of these matters is far from straightforward and subject to
4 It should be noted, however, that recent work disaggregating national ecological footprints
with the help of input-output analysis can provide a basis for the development of policies
aimed at limiting or reducing categories of consumption by households and other groups,
especially of those goods and services that have a high ecological footprint. This could
complement an ES approach which aims to quantify the total amounts to/by which resource
consumption should be limited or reduced (Wiedman, et al., 2006).
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considerable uncertainty. Moreover, environmental data bases and monitoring and
reporting systems in many parts of the world are weak, creating information gaps.
Furthermore, identifying quantitative sustainable limits to resource consumption
involves not just scientific questions but also value judgements. Both kinds of
assessments inevitably imply making assumptions that are open to challenge.
Getting a sufficient degree of agreement on environmental risks and limits, to the
extent that they become politically ‘saleable’, is far from straightforward, as the issue
of climate change has clearly demonstrated.
Thus far, assessments of environmental space have relied heavily on the analyses
and methodologies developed and undertaken by one organisation, the Wuppertal
Institute.5 Whilst scientists working for or with the Institute have impeccable scientific
credentials, this does not imply that their analyses and findings are beyond critique.
Moffat (Moffatt, 1996) points out some of the weaknesses in the methodology used in
environmental space analyses, including a lack of consistency in the scales (global,
national, regional) used for assessing environmental space, the obfuscation of
inequality of resource consumption within nations by relying on per capita data and,
most importantly, the failure to substantiate the precise grounds on which targets for
a reduction of material inputs has been based. That operatonalising the concept of
environmental space is not a simple and straightforward matter is also made clear by
several other authors (De Jonge, et al., 2001; Hille, 1997; Weterings and Opschoor,
1994), although none of these considers the difficulties fatal or insurmountable. Yet, it
seems that ES analysts underestimate the scope for disagreement (or alternative
interpretations fed by conflicting political ideologies and interests) on these matters,
or think that these can be overcome or ignored by strictly separating the analysis of
environmental space (by scientists) from politics (De Jonge, et al., 2001: 55). As the
climate change debate has amply demonstrated, this is rather hopeful if not naïve
thinking.
A related issue is the small size of the epistemic community associated with the
notion of environmental space. Only a handful of academics and environmental
advocates have embraced the concept as a focus for study and writing, although a
larger number of people have been involved in discussions related to the production,
under the aegis of Friends of the Earth, of the country reports for more close to thirty
European countries. However, thus far, the notion of environmental space has failed
5 The heavy reliance on the work of the Institute in environmental space assessments
is most apparent in Towards Sustainable Europe report (Friends of the Earth Europe,
1995), and in Greening the North (Sachs, et al., 1998).
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to capture the attention and imagination of the media, with the result that most of
the public is unfamiliar with the idea. Similarly, support for the adoption and
implementation of the concept within government circles has been very limited,
confined mostly to some officials in the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. “So far,
the voices calling for environmental space to be instituted as a guiding principle have
been few and far in between, and rather muted” (Bührs, 2004: 443).
The weak and ineffective agency basis for the adoption of environmental space is not
just a question of size and a lack of persuasiveness on the part of its epistemic
community, but also, and mainly, of political economy. To put it simply, very few
people and businesses, especially in high income countries, stand to gain from the
introduction of limits to resource consumption, whereas many stand to lose.
Consequently, governments, also, will find imposing limits politically unattractive and
unfeasible, not in the least as it reduces their scope for meeting rising and conflicting
demands. Rather, they prefer to support a notion of sustainable development which
sees continued growth and environmental protection as compatible.
Furthermore, the acceptance of limits on resource consumption by national
governments is made unlikely because of a ‘collective action trap’. Why would any
government accept limits to resource consumption (especially of imported resources)
if other governments are not doing the same? From a ‘rational’ point of view, it makes
no sense to accept such constraints if other countries continue to expand their
consumption. In other words, the erosion of the global resource base is subject to the
‘tragedy of the commons’ phenomenon: as all countries have no ‘rational’ incentive to
individually restrict their use of resources, inevitably, the collective resource base will
be run down and destroyed. That is, unless governments are able and willing to
come to a collective agreement to institute rules by which they bind themselves.
Thus far, environmental space analyses and advocates have focused mostly on
assessing and adopting space at the national level. This focus has been deliberate
given the differences between countries in resource consumption, and because
national governments hold the key to national policies regarding resource use and
consumption.6
6 The Towards Sustainable Europe report is the obvious exception, but this reflects the
growing importance of the EU as a state-like actor affecting resource consumption within EU
countries rather than a concern with how agreement on limiting resource consumption can be
achieved internationally or globally.
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Although some environmental space analysts do offer ideas on how sustainable
production and consumption can be promoted globally (Carley and Spapens, 1998:
168-191; Sachs, et al., 1998: 202-221), they pay little if any attention to the collective
action problem and the political-economic obstacles to the adoption of the approach
at the international and global level. Consequently, these ideas are more in the
nature of wishful thinking than of a hard-nosed political strategy aimed at the
strengthening of agency.
Although ideas are crucially important, they need to be combined with an analysis
and assessment of their (potential) support basis, and/or of how a support basis can
be built and strengthened. In the following section, I present a framework for
undertaking such an analysis.
The political-economic analysis of environmental space: towards a framework
Political economic analysis involves the study of phenomena from a combined
political-economic perspective. Whereas mainstream political science focuses
primarily on the relative power and influence of actors (in particular on government
decision making), and mainstream economics studies and prescribes decisions on
the basis of ‘rational’ models of economic behaviour, political-economy is based on
the idea that the study of politics and economics should and cannot be separated but
must be combined because of the interwovenness of these spheres (Palan, 2000).
Political economy does not encompass a cohesive or even coherent body of
knowledge, framework for analysis, or methodology. As Palan notes, at least three
different streams can be identified under the political economy label, including one
rooted in neo-classical economics, one based on Marxian political economy, and a
‘post-rationalist’ stream that pulls in also history and culture (Palan, 2000). As the
disciplinary boundaries between the social sciences have weakened, and the
traditional strands within International Relations theory, often referred to as Realism,
Institutionalism and Structuralism (or World System approaches) are also getting
blurred, new lines of division, reflecting those evolving within the social sciences, are
also penetrating the field of Political Economy, creating considerable confusion.
Different views on globalisation contribute to the diversity of the field, which is also
sometimes referred to as International Political Economy (IPE) or Global Political
Economy (Buzan, 2005; Gill, 2002; Ravenhill, 2005). The diversity of views and
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approaches has also affected political-economic analyses of environmental
developments and policy (Levy and Newell, 2005b; O'Connor, 1994b; Oates and
Portney, 2003; Williams, 1996).
Here, I will take an eclectic approach to building a framework for analysing the issues
and obstacles associated with the (possible) adoption of the environmental space
approach at the global level. The rationale for doing so is that none of the
frameworks advanced by the various authors referred to above capture all the factors
that seem important from tentative reflection on the kind of issues and obstacles that
are encountered. The aim here is not to present a ‘complete’ range of factors (as if
that were possible), or a model, or to ‘prove’ the relative importance of the various
factors mentioned. The purpose is to try to make sense of the wide range of
potentially important factors by identifying some main categories, and to put forward
some preliminary and tentative thoughts that could provide a basis for more detailed
study, analysis and discussion. The importance of the linkages between these factors
(and categories), which provide for a dynamic framework (which may help explain
changes of factors within the categories) needs to be emphasised. The four
categories of factors, encompassing elements derived from mainly structuralist and
neo-Gramscian approaches are: structural or systemic, material, ideological, and
agency.
Structural (systemic) factors affecting resource politics and policy
Structural or systemic political-economic factors affecting (decisions regarding)
resource consumption relate to the dominant economic system (capitalism), the
political (state) system, and the connections between the two. By their (systemic)
nature, such factors condition and affect all actors operating within these systems, be
it differently, depending on the role, position, and power of actors within these
systems. Here, we are interested in exploring the general influences on resource
consumption emanating from the prevailing political and economic systems, and to
assess to what extent these systems may hinder or be conducive to the adoption of
the environmental space approach.
Although there are significant differences between political systems, and these
differences can have significant consequences for the environmental performance of
countries (Jahn, 2005; Scruggs, 2003), they all operate within a global system of
states based formally on the notion of sovereignty. Theorists (notably Realists and
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Institutionalists) may disagree on the degree to which competition or cooperation is
the dominant feature or tendency of the state system, but both recognise that states
are fundamentally concerned about the protection and promotion of their own
interests. Foremost among these is the protection of the state’s territorial integrity
and security. States differ in size, capacity and the amount of money spent on this
function, but altogether the resources expended on ‘security’ are enormous. In 2006,
global military expenditure reached more than one trillion US dollars (US$ 1204
billion), 46% of which was spent by the US alone (SIPRI, 2007: 11). Armed forces
are a major user and consumer of resources (including energy and metals), and a
significant source of pollution in their own right (Karbuz, 2007; Shriner, 2007; Turse,
2007). The competitive state system, and the associated ‘security imperative’, is a
significant driving force behind the demand for resources and this is likely to remain
so until such time that an effective collective security system has been established.
Capitalism, the dominant global economic system, is also a major driving force
behind the consumption of resources. Marx identified the accumulation of capital as
an inherent imperative of capitalism (the expansion of capital driven by competition),
accompanied by a continuous process of commodification (turning labour, nature and
more and more aspects of life into commodities) and the expansion of markets (all
over the world). Although capitalism is subject to periods of crises, over time,
production and consumption, and the demand for resources and markets, continue to
expand. If anything, the importance assigned to the accumulation imperative has
grown with economic globalisation, pushed by western governments and
international agencies (including the WTO, IMF and the World Bank).
States, not despite but because of globalisation, continue to play a significant role in
the competitive struggle between the conglomerates of capital, and in making and
maintaining their economies competitive. Arguably, states have become even more
‘competition states’ (Cerny, 1997) than they already were under the state system
referred to above, blending economic, geo-political and military functions. With the
‘return of scarcity’ and the growing perception of ‘environmental threats’, we already
see a sharpening of competition and conflict over resources across the three
arenas.7
7 As exemplified in the jostling over the Arctic and its resources, the reassertion of territorial
and sea-bed claims, the collapse of WTO free-trade talks, and the war in Iraq which, even
according to the non-radical ex-governor of the US Reserve Bank, Alan Greenspan, was ‘all
about oil” (Adams, 2007).
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Given these structural political-economic factors and forces, the question arises
whether capitalism and the state system can be made compatible with the
requirement of reducing resource consumption predicated on the environmental
space approach. As yet, no equivocal answer to this question can be given. Some
seem to think that, subject to a few changes, capitalism can be made sustainable.
Buttel, for instance, argues that “A few major policy changes that might obtain wide
consensus could have a major impact in inducing a shift in the direction of
sustainability”.8 Others take a more cautious or pessimistic view. O’Connor’s short
answer to the question whether capitalism is sustainable is “No’, and the long answer
“Probably not”,9 whereas Kovel’s view on the matter can probably be summarised as
‘definitely not’.10
When addressing this question we should remind ourselves that more is required
than mitigating or reducing environmental effects (pollution etc.). If the assumptions
underlying the ES approach hold true, actual resource consumption in rich countries
must be reduced by a significant factor and, after having increased to an allowable
level, be contained in lower income countries. If economic growth is an inherent
imperative of capitalism, this implies that growth has to be channelled into areas of
production and consumption that require very low quantities of resources, and/or a
continuous increase in resource efficiency to the extent that ‘absolute decoupling’ (an
absolute reduction of resource use and environmental effects) is achieved. This is
likely to require the creation of ‘circular economies’ and the transformation of
production and consumption into ‘closed loop’ systems. As yet, such a transformation
is well out of sight, and unlikely to occur without strong planning, guidance and
investment by governments.
Whether governments will be able and willing to move into this direction depends on
whether they, and the wider state system of which they are an active component, can
be ‘greened’. Again, the jury is still out on this question, even though most
governments now proclaim their commitment to environmental protection. It has been
argued that some states are considerably ‘greener’ than others, but, as yet, no state
can be called ‘green’ (Dryzek, et al., 2003). Although some authors have sketched
out what a green state could or should look like, and are relatively optimistic about
the prospects of this happening (Barry and Eckersley, 2005; Eckersley, 2004;
Meadowcroft, 2005), this outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Again, we need to
8 (Buttel, 1998: 282)
9 (O'Connor, 1994a: 154)
10 (Kovel, 2002)
16
remind ourselves that more is required than environmental mitigation or a weak
form of Ecological Modernisation. Also, the more governments entrap their countries
into patterns and institutions of economic interdependence, the more difficult it
becomes to achieve the kind of economic transformation described above.
Notwithstanding these rather pessimistic observations, the possibility of rapid
political-economic transformation, forced by an extreme deterioration of
environmental and resource conditions, cannot be discarded. Almost by nature,
systems change tends to occur through a process of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, during
short bursts of rapid change rather than through a gradual process. The question
whether the political-economic systems can and will change in response to the
erosion of environmental space is more likely to be answered in practice than by
further study and debate.
The material bases of resource politics and policy
Whilst systemic political-economic factors create the general conditions driving
resource decisions and practices regarding resource consumption, the specific
nature of those decisions are shaped by political-economic actors. Which resources
get exploited, where, how and by how much depends on the decisions made by
those who have access to and control over resources. Countries vary greatly in
resource endowment, the structure of their economies, economic and technological
capacity, political stability and effectiveness, and level of income, to name just a few
factors that influence their resource consumption. Equally important differences exist
within countries between citizens, social classes, and economic and political actors
with regard to access to, ownership of, and control over resources.
Whether the limits to environmental space will be respected, depends in large part on
the decisions and practices of those who have (a degree of) control over specific
resources and resource use and consumption, such as land, forests, water, and
minerals. This includes farmers, corporations, financial institutions, governments (at
various levels) and non-governmental organisations. The retail sector, media, and
consumers also play a significant role, notably on the demand side.
Assessing the scope for reducing resource consumption, therefore, requires analysis
of the interests and networks of actors or ‘stakeholders’ associated with a particular
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resource, and of their relative power and influence over decisions affecting
resource use and consumption. Here, we are interested foremost in the ‘material’
interests of the various parties in the resource, and in the degree to which they
control or influence decisions, not so much in their stated views. Although it has
become commonplace to regard ‘interests’ as ‘constructed’ rather than ‘real’
phenomena, the approach advocated here is based on the assumption that financial-
economic and political-economic stakes in resources (including ownership and
shares in material benefits) are important influences on people’s views and actions
(even if they do not determine them), especially in the case of organisations (in which
interests have been institutionalised). This does not imply dismissing the importance
of ideas, discourse and ideology, discussed in the following section. However, we
need to be sceptical about views and analyses which imply that decisions (on
resource consumption or for that matter any other issue) depend solely or even
mostly on rational discussion and persuasion. We need to be aware of how ‘rational’
arguments and the ability to persuade are influenced by material interests and power
structures.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and analyse the interests and
networks associated with particular resources. However, some general tentative
propositions can be made based on previous studies and observations. They relate
to differences in dependence on imports and exports, the role of TNCs and
international organisations, and the importance of diversity within sectors.
Low income countries that depend heavily on resource exports (oil, minerals,
particular crops), it would appear, have little or no incentive to advocate a reduction
of resource use or consumption. Reducing the demand for resources is likely to lower
their price and thus even reduce the already low income level of many of these
countries. Thus, ironically, reducing resource consumption in high income countries
with the aim to give more ‘environmental space’ to people in lower income countries
may have the perverse effect of further diminishing the ability of the latter to increase
their consumption. Governments of countries largely dependent of resource exports,
unsurprisingly, are unlikely to be strong advocates of the adoption of the
environmental space approach, despite its stated aim to reduce inequity in resource
consumption.
However, this may change if and when countries dependent on resource exports are
able to secure a degree of collective control over supply and price, for instance,
through producer cartels such as the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC).
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By collectively limiting supply, producer countries can keep prices high and
increase their income. Inasmuch as high prices reduce the demand for resources,
and substitutes are not readily available, this also has the effect of extending the life
of the resource basis in the producer countries. However, the establishment of
effective resource producers cartels contravenes dominant free market ideology and
is likely to be opposed and undermined (if they can) by importing countries, as the
failure of ‘commodity agreements’ in the 1970s, aimed at the stabilisation of income
of low income countries, has demonstrated (Raffaelli, 1995; Ricupero, 2004).
By contrast, countries that depend heavily on resource imports (such as Japan and
EU states), have an apparent interest in reducing their dependence on such
materials, for instance, by increasing resource efficiency and recycling. This seems
to concur, at least in some cases, with the relative popularity of the notion of
‘Ecological Modernisation’ (EM) in such countries (notably in Germany, Japan,
Sweden and the Netherlands), and with the relatively greater interest in, and support
for (research on), increasing resource efficiency (by a Factor 4 or even 10), recycling,
industrial ecology and transformation, and the notion of environmental space. Not all
governments, industries, and groups share this interest, however, and the extent to
which EM is translated into effective policy and institutional change depends largely
on the relative economic weight, power and influence, of the various parties involved
(with importers and the transport industry being examples of sectors that are likely to
have no interest in reducing imports).
A second proposition regarding the material bases of resource politics and policies
relates to the growing role and importance of TNCs and International Organisations
in the development of international regimes affecting resources. Increasingly,
resources, from oil, metals, water, forests, fibres and agricultural land, are owned,
controlled and managed by big corporations, directly or indirectly (Ridgeway, 2004).
TNCs play a significant, though understudied, role in the development of international
regimes for resources, including formal agreements regarding their conservation and
protection (Levy and Newell, 2005a; Strange, 1994; 1996). Combined with
international organisations like the WTO, IMF and the World Bank, which are often
regarded as serving the interests of TNCs by promotion the opening of markets for
goods, services and investments, they may have more clout in resource decisions
than governments.
The third point to be made here is that material interests, within countries and even
within sectors and industries, are not necessarily homogeneous. Obviously, countries
19
differ greatly in their access to, and control over, resources, related to their (geo-)
political, financial-economic, and military power. To understand and address the
factors affecting global resource consumption, it makes more sense to study the
interests and role of specific players (such as the US, the EU, China, India, Brazil),
than to try to develop general theories of ‘state behaviour’. If the erosion of
environmental space is to be addressed, effectively and within the foreseeable future,
study and action focusing on the main players is imperative.
Similarly, the material interests within the business sector, and even within the same
industries, are not necessarily homogeneous, but are likely to vary with their relative
position (size, capacity, competitive position). As studies of a variety of industries,
including the oil, chemical and biotech industries demonstrate (Levy and Newell,
2005a), such differences are important when it comes to the relative power of
companies to influence politics and policies, including international regimes, and their
ability and willingness to take on board environmental concerns. However, as noted
before, the question is not just about the extent to which companies are willing and
able to mitigate their environmental impacts, but about their place and role in the
demand for resources and whether/how they can be restructured, in the context of a
broader transformation led by governments, towards a sustainable and equitable
economy.
The role of material interests and the relative power and control over resources need
to be understood and addressed if a significant reduction of resource consumption is
to be achieved. However, the role and importance of these factors is often hidden or
camouflaged by dominant ideologies and discourses that prevent or obstruct
concerted and effective action aimed at addressing them.
Ideology and resource consumption
The role of ideas and ideology has been a subject in the study of politics and society
from Plato to Hegel, and Marx and Engels to Gramsci, to more recent studies and
debate about the importance of ideas, knowledge, reason, and discourses in politics
and policy (Campbell, 2002; Stone, 1988; White, 1994). It has also become a major
topic in the study of environmental politics and policy (Dryzek, 1997; Gibson, 2002;
Sandbach, 1980). The way environmental issues are interpreted obviously is a
crucial factor in the formation of decisions and policies affecting resource
consumption.
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However, whilst many authors and studies recognise the importance of ideas in
shaping (environmental) interpretations, politics and policies, they often do so without
linking them to specific actors and their material interests, as discussed above
(Campbell, 2002). Often, the assumption seems to be made that decisions and
policies are shaped primarily by discourse and debate, and that the power of ‘good
ideas’, rational argument and persuasion are the most important factors. Even if this
may not be always the case, solutions for changing or improving policies are often
sought in enhancing the role of these values and in promoting ‘deliberative
democracy’. What many authors seem to underestimate is the degree to which
powerful actors, based on their privileged material and political positions, are able to
influence or even manipulate the formation and adoption of dominant or hegemonic
ideas. The popularity of the term discourse vis-à-vis the term ideology appears to be
associated with growing preference for a less ‘ideological’ interpretation of politics,
reflected most explicitly in the argument that the role of ideologies has come to and
end with the ‘victory’ of capitalism over socialism (Fukuyama, 1992).
The idea that a reduction of resource consumption is required to effectively address
the environmental problematique is definitely not a dominant idea. On the contrary,
dominant environmental discourse, embodied foremost in the idea of sustainable
development, advances the view that continued economic growth is not only
compatible with, but necessary for, achieving sustainability. Similarly, the notion of
‘weak’ Ecological Modernisation, popular with some governments, is based on the
view that environmental problems can be resolved primarily by economically
advantageous technological innovation. Both ‘discourses’ are largely a-political in the
sense that they hold up normative (‘good’) ideas that should be embraced by
‘everyone’. If some people, groups, businesses or governments fail to do so, this is
seen foremost as a failure on their part to see the merits and importance of these
ideas. Education and persuasion are usually held up as the best remedies for
converting them to these ideas.
Although Ecological Modernisation, where adopted, may lead to resource efficiency
gains, these mostly represent ‘relative decoupling’ (growth in emissions and resource
consumption less than the rate of economic growth), and are insufficient to bring
about the radical reductions in resource consumption predicated on the ES
approach. The effects of the adoption of ‘sustainable development’, broadly and
vaguely defined by governments and businesses, on resource consumption are even
less impressive (Fanelli, 2007). Given their compatibility with continued economic
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growth, their broad scope for interpretation, and their emphasis on shared
responsibility, it is not surprising that these ideas have proven to be acceptable or
even attractive to (most) governments and many businesses.
Continued growth in resource consumption is also supported by other dominant (non-
environmental) ideas and discourses, firmly rooted in material interests. Arguably the
most pernicious among these is the idea that the improving the quality of life of
people involves and requires a growth in income and consumption, especially of
material and ‘positional’ goods (goods that improve someone’s social status vis-à-vis
others). Although the idea can be challenged on normative and empirical grounds
(Hamilton, 2003), it continues to hold many if not most people in its grip, all around
the world. It is probably the most damaging ideology, socially and environmentally,
driving more and more people to ever higher levels of consumption (among other in
the form of holiday travel to ‘exotic’ destinations, sometimes under the label of ‘eco-
tourism’). Consumerist ideology is, of course, firmly rooted in material interests,
including those of producers, the multi-billion dollar advertising industry, and the
media (most of which depend on income from advertising). In this context, it seems
unrealistic to ask consumers to change their values and lifestyles and to move
towards a greater emphasis on non-material aspects, as advocated by some ES
advocates (Carley and Spapens, 1998: 134-167).
Challenging this modern dogma of faith is arguably the biggest challenge facing
environmental (including ES) advocates, not only because of its addictive nature and
the formidable power of the vested interests on which it is based, but also because
real poverty and sharp inequalities in the material standard of living still exist and, if
anything, continue to increase (Stewart and Berry, 1999; Wade, 2003). Economic
growth, rather than a redistribution of income, is still seen as the main means for
lifting people out of ‘extreme poverty’ (income less than US$ 1 per day according to
the World Bank), and also as the ‘great equaliser’ in rich countries. Putting limits on
resource consumption easily could be construed as preventing the poor to ‘catch up’
with the rich. But it could also re-ignite demands for the adoption of a just income
policy and for income redistribution, ideas that definitely will find strong resistance
among the better off.
Thus far, the discussion has focused foremost on factors that constitute political-
economic obstacles to the adoption of the environmental space approach, at the
systemic, material and ideological levels. There are, it seems, few if any grounds for
being optimistic that the approach will be adopted, at the national and/or international
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level. This preliminary conclusion raises the question whether there is a possibility
that, through agency, in first instance, on the part of those who advocate the
approach, these factors could be addressed and changed to improve the chances
the approach.
Agency and environmental space
As noted earlier in this paper, the advocates of the ES approach are far and in
between. Support for its adoption has been confined mostly to a handful of
academics, environmentalists (notably Friends of the Earth), and a few government
officials in some countries. Given such a weak support basis, and the formidable
political-economic obstacles sketched above, further advancing the idea with some
chance of success may seem a hopeless task.
Yet, the support and agency basis for the recognition of environmental limits is
considerably broader than the size of the environmental space discourse community
suggests. In fact, many people and groups work towards the same or at least similar
goals and objectives as those advocated by the environmental space community but
not under their label or umbrella. Probably the most important organisation in this
respect is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which has played
a key role in getting climate change on the global agenda. By making clear the limits
to greenhouse gas emissions that need to be respected if global warming is to be
contained within a ‘safe’ range, implicitly, the IPCC supports the first tenet of the ES
approach. However, the organisation’s recommendations do not, explicitly or
implicitly, endorse the second (strong equity) principle, the right of all people to an
equal share of environmental space, which could be translated into equal per capita
emissions entitlements. Nonetheless, equity issues do play a significant role in the
debate and negotiations about the follow up regime to the Kyoto Protocol, which
expires in 2012.
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in its latest Global
Environmental Outlook report, also notes that humanity already consumes more
resources than is sustainable, and identifies rising resource consumption, together
with population and economic growth, globalization and social values, as one of the
drivers behind the build up of environmental pressures (United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), 2007: 458). Addressing the more persistent environmental
problems, the report argues, will require “transformative structural changes” that
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“challenge existing societal structures, consumption and production patterns,
economies, power relationships, and the distribution” (United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), 2007: 470). Few governments have even started to develop
policies addressing these drivers, and doing so at the global level is also hampered
by the “many veto points that allow interest groups to stop ambitious policies” (United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2007: 472). Among other things, the
UNEP advocates more effective environmental policy integration and the use of
“mandatory limits”, although these are not explicitly linked to resource consumption
(United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2007: 464)
Many other groups and organisations around the world effectively advocate the
recognition of environmental limits, for instance, by working for the conservation of
natural areas, for the protection of rivers, opposing mining and other environmentally
damaging ‘development’ proposals, and by demanding strict limits on pollution.
Often, they combine these actions with a concern about inequity and injustice, and
for protecting and enhancing the livelihood and interests of indigenous and other
communities. Many environmental groups concentrate their efforts on the protection
of particular resources (such as tropical rainforests, water), or on promoting the use
of alternative resources and technologies (notably to generate energy), to reduce the
environmental impacts on humans. Putting a halt to, or even reducing, human
populations, even though this is a political ‘hot potato’, advocated stubbornly by some
groups, is another way of bringing resource consumption to within environmental
limits, enabling people to retain more environmental space.
The main differences between these efforts and the ES approach is that the latter
focuses (in most cases) on the reduction of resource consumption (rather than on
mitigating effects), provides for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to
combating environmental problems (by linking most of these to resource use), and
puts forward specific, and quite radical, targets for reducing and containing resource
consumption, making the size of the challenge quite explicit. Moreover, the strong
equity principle on which the ES approach is based is not necessarily shared by all
groups referred to above.
Thus, in many cases, the manifold actions of environmental advocates can be seen
as compatible but fragmented steps in the implementation of the ES approach. Given
the low public profile of the notion of ES, and present weak support for a more
integrated and forceful approach to our global environmental predicament, the best
prospects for advancing the approach seem to lie in a continued strengthening of
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support and action, from the local to the global level, for addressing specific
environmental issues, especially those that ‘feed back’ into a broad range of resource
use (like climate change). As people are more easily aroused by demonstrable
environmental problems and threats, it will always be easier to boost support for
environmental measures by highlighting those rather than by advocating a drastic
reduction in resource consumption, the idea of which is more likely to put many
people off.
This means that a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the
environmental problematique, focusing more on underlying driving forces than on
(containing) effects, as advocated by ES advocates, is unlikely to be adopted in the
near future. However, that does not mean that action aimed at realising such an
approach needs or is to be postponed. Increasingly, the linkages between
environmental problems (such as climate and the problems associated with land,
forests, biodiversity, water, to name just a few) are becoming apparent, and slowly
but steadily the underlying policies and actions that are responsible for these
pressures are being questioned (Najam, et al., 2007; United Nations Environment
Programme, 2007). This is likely to improve the scope for forging more concerted
action and strategic coalition formation between environmental groups and
sympathetic individuals and organisation within government and businesses, at and
between different levels, from local to global. As noted above, the material interests
between and within governments and businesses, even within the same industry, are
not necessarily homogeneous, which opens up possibilities for the formation of
coalitions that contest the dominant paradigm. Analysis and effective use of these
opportunities may, eventually, lead to the emergence of a new hegemony (Levy and
Newell, 2005b), one that is more in line with the need to respect limits and equity in
resource consumption.
Given the formidable constraints to the adoption of ES as a cognitive framework at
the global level, it seems premature to design a global architecture for the approach.
However, given the opportunities referred to above, there is merit in reflecting on how
institutional change at the global level may help to support the move towards a more
comprehensive and integrated approach to the environmental problematique.
Towards a global political-economic architecture of environmental space
The adoption of the ES approach at the global level, if this is going to happen, is
unlikely to be based on some kind of blueprint drawn by academics. Although ideas
on how the approach can or should be institutionally supported may well play an
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important role in debates and negotiations on this matter, the framework will most
certainly come about as a result of the interplay between the most powerful political-
economic forces, based on different and often conflicting interests, and constitute a
compromise rather than a product of rational design.
In the light of this observation, and the discussion of obstacles to the adoption of the
approach, it seems clear that, at this stage, there is no chance of an official ‘World
Environmental Space’ agency being created, even if it were to be proposed. Although
the case for establishing a World Environment Organisation (WEO) has been put
forward (Biermann and Bauer, 2005; Charnovitz, 2005; Simonis, 2002), and has
received some political backing, this has not been sufficient to persuade
governments (Charnovitz, 2005). Even in academic circles, the need for creating
such an agency has been contested and deemed undesirable as well as unrealistic
(DeSombre, 2006; Najam, 2003). Yet, the idea should not be dismissed, as at some
stage the need for a ‘central’ environmental agency, as in national contexts, may find
greater recognition.
As the erosion of environmental space progresses, and the capacity of environmental
systems and resources to meet rising demands (for food/fertile land; fresh water; a
range of minerals) approaches or crosses multiple ‘tipping points’ or ‘peaks’ (like
‘peak oil’), this is likely to generate stronger demand and support for global regulatory
frameworks. With ‘crises of supply’ looming in several interconnected areas, a strong
case can be made for strengthening or establishing institutions that can work towards
creating a common cognitive basis for the development of such frameworks.
Analogous to the IPCC, other international panels (for instance, on renewable and/or
non-renewable resources) could be established to play a crucial role in advancing, in
a less overt political way than by direct talks between governments, a shared
understanding of the nature of the problems and of possible solutions for addressing
them.
In the mean time, however, it seems that strengthening the capacity of existing
international agencies, including the UNEP, the Commission on Sustainable
Development, and the global architecture (institutional framework) to address climate
change, offer the most promising prospects for promoting the integration of
environmental concerns within and across different areas of policy (regime)
development at the global level. At the same time, there is plenty of scope for
improving the effectiveness of existing environmental regimes for particular issues or
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areas, by providing better mechanisms for co-ordination between them and/or by
‘bundling’ them, given the overlap between them and common underlying causes.
Though unsatisfactory, and arguably ‘too little and too late’, a more fundamental
restructuring of global institutions aimed at requiring or even promoting a high degree
of constraint in resource consumption, and for sharing environmental space more
equitably, appears unrealistic at this stage.
Conclusion
The notion of environmental space has been advanced as a means for providing
specific policy guidance to governments on how to implement sustainability. Rather
than prescribing objectives and targets for mitigating environmental effects, it focuses
on resource consumption as the underlying cause of environmental problems. Based
on an integrated analysis of linkages between resource consumption and
environmental effects, and on a strong equity principle (equal per capita resource
entitlements), the approach assesses, on a country-by-country level, the extent to
which consumption needs to be reduced or can be allowed to grow.
Thus far, it has proven to be difficult to get governments to adopt the approach, for
several reasons, including the international collective action problem. In an
increasingly interdependent world, it makes little sense for individual governments to
limit or reduce their use of resources if other countries also do not do so. This
suggests that the environmental space approach will need to be adopted at the
international (or even global) level, to be implemented effectively also at the national
level. The aim of this paper has been to explore, in a political-economic context, the
prospects for this to occur.
Based on a framework consisting of four main categories of factors
(structural/systemic, material, ideological, and agency), and a tentative discussion of
some of these factors, it can be concluded that the political-economic obstacles to
the adoption of the environmental space approach at the international/global level are
formidable. This preliminary assessment appears to lead to the conclusion that ‘What
must be done, cannot be done’. The factors and forces opposing resource
consumption simply seem overwhelming whilst those advocating and acting on
behalf of such an approach constitute a weak agency basis at best.
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Notwithstanding the small group of advocates associated with the environmental
space approach, the efforts of many individuals, groups and organisations aimed at
mitigating or resolving environmental problems, although not undertaken under the
Environmental Space label or umbrella, also often result in, or are conducive to,
limiting or reducing the consumption of resources. Many people also advocate
greater equity in access to resources, or to the benefits derived from their use. Thus,
the agency and support basis for the environmental space approach can be deemed
much broader than the small epistemic community associated with the concept. As
political mobilisation on the basis of specific environmental problems is (relatively)
much easier than on a platform of advocating limits to, or a reduction of, resource
consumption, it seems wise, also for advocates of the ES approach, to support and
strengthen these other efforts, even if these are likely to fall short of what is required.
Strategically, the most promising prospects for advancing the environmental space
approach lie in a strengthening of the climate change regime, given the linkages
between the factors driving climate change, within and across range of ‘key’ policy
areas, and resource consumption. Given the growing global concern about the
serious threats from climate change, and the associated imperative of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions (rather than just mitigating them), and the limitations to
achieving adequate reductions only by increasing resource efficiency, the need for
putting limits on resource consumption is likely to become apparent. However, this
does not imply necessarily that, politically, all governments will be able and willing to
reduce or limit resource consumption: they may well become pre-occupied with
securing their own access to and control over resources, de facto shifting or imposing
limits on others, a process which seems well underway under the flag of protecting
‘environmental security’. Arguably, the creation of a new collective security system
that recognises humanity as one ‘community of fate’ is a precondition for any
progress on ensuring protection of the common global resource basis.
Sharing environmental space globally and equitably is arguably the most daunting,
unprecedented, and increasingly urgent challenge confronting mankind. Although
many societies have faced and undergone collapse as a result of their eroding
resource basis, people often had the option of going ‘somewhere else’. With the rapid
erosion of the human life support basis in many if not all parts of the world, and
increased global interdependence in the supply of resources and processed goods,
any decline or collapse of a significant resource basis, wherever in the world, will
have repercussions elsewhere. If humans are to maintain a decent standard of
living, and to avoid a global meltdown of law and order, the adoption of the
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environmental space approach at all levels of governance is a political and moral
imperative.
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